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Opinion dynamics and stubbornness through mean-field games
Leonardo Stella, Fabio Bagagiolo, Dario Bauso, Giacomo Como.
Abstract—This paper provides a mean field game theo-
retic interpretation of opinion dynamics and stubbornness.
The model describes a crowd-seeking homogeneous population
of agents, under the influence of one stubborn agent. The
game takes on the form of two partial differential equations,
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the Kolmogorov-
Fokker-Planck equation for the individual optimal response and
the population evolution, respectively. For the game of interest,
we establish a mean field equilibrium where all agents reach
ε-consensus in a neighborhood of the stubborn agent’s opinion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years there has been an increasing inter-
est in the field of opinion dynamics. These describe the time
evolution of the beliefs of a typically very large population of
agents in response to repeated interactions among themselves
over a social network (see, e.g., [6, Sect. III] and [1]). In
continuous opinion dynamics, beliefs (hereafter opinions or
beliefs are used interchangeably) are represented as scalars
or vectors, each moving towards a convex combinations of
(a subset of) other agents’ current beliefs, thus modeling the
attractive nature of social influence. Standard models predict,
provided that the underlying social network is connected, that
a consensus among the agents is achieved asymptotically
in time. Exceptions are provided by bounded confidence
models [11], whereby agents do not take into account the
influence of other agents whose beliefs are too different
from theirs, as well as models with competing stubborn
agents [2] who do not change their opinions but are able
to influence the ones of the rest of the population. Such
stubborn agents might represent leaders, political parties or
media sources attempting to influence the beliefs in the
rest of the population. Scaling limits results (see, e.g., [7])
show that, if the agents’ population is homogeneous, the
empirical belief distribution converges, as the population size
grows large, towards the solution of a certain deterministic
mean-field differential equation in the space of probability
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measures. Such results are in the spirit of the propagation of
chaos [8] in interacting particle systems.
As a matter of fact, interactions among particles is a main
element in the theory of mean field games initiated by Lasry
and Lions in [13], [4]. The underlying idea is that a large
number of indistinguishable players (the particles) interact
so that the strategies of a single player is influenced by
the distribution of the other players. Such a model has been
shown to be useful in several application domains such as
economics, physics, biology, and network engineering (see
[3], [5], [9], [10], [12], [15], [17]).
Main contribution. In this paper we propose an approach
to opinion dynamics within the framework of mean-field
games. We focus on a stochastic model with time-continuous
beliefs comprising a homogeneous population of agents, plus
one stubborn agent trying to influence them.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a
mean field game theoretic interpretation of opinion dynamics
and stubbornness. The game takes the form of two partial
differential equations (PDEs), which is the classical structure
of a mean field game. The first PDE is the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation which has to be solved backward
in time once we fix a penalty on the final deviation of the
individual’s opinion from the mainstream opinion (this is
true for a finite horizon formulation). The second PDE is
the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation which describes the
density evolution of the players’ opinions in response to the
individuals’ optimal behaviors as returned by the first PDE.
[13], [16].
For the game of interest, we also establish a mean
field equilibrium where all agents reach ε-consensus in a
neighborhood of the stubborn agent’s opinion. Mean field
equilibrium strategies are shown to be state-feedback linear
control policies. In addition to this, the tolerance ε appears
to essentially depend on the Brownian Motion, and decrease
on the number of players. We illustrate the theoretical results
on numerical examples.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we set up
the problem and related model. In Section III, we analyze
the system microscopic behavior, and study equilibria and
stability. In Section IV, we provide numerical results. Finally,
in Section V, we provide conclusions.
Notation We denote by (Ω,F ,P) a complete probability
space. We let B be a finite-dimensional standard Brownian
motion process defined on this probability space. We define
F = (Ft)t≥0, its natural filtration augmented by all the
P−null sets (sets of measure-zero with the respect P). We
write ∂x and ∂
2
xx to stand respectively for the first and second
derivatives with respect to x.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM SET-UP
Consider a population of homogeneous agents (players),
each one characterized by an opinion X(t) ∈ R at time 0 ≤
t ≤ T , where [0, T ] is the time horizon window. The control
variable is a measurable function of time u1(·), defined
from [0, T ] to R and establishes the rate of variation of an
agent’s opinion. A stubborn agent tries to disturb the agents’
opinions in a way that is proportional to his advertisement
efforts u2(·), a measurable function from [0, T ] to R, which
is the control of the stubborn agent.
It turns out that the opinion dynamics can be written in
the form X ′ = f(X,u1, u2)+σdB with f : R×R×R→ R
constant in X and linear in the controls:{
dX(s) = (u1(s) + u2(s))ds+ σdB(s), s > t
X(t) = x,
(1)
where σ > 0 is a weighting coefficient and dB(t) is a
Brownian motion.
Consider a probability density functionm : R×[0,+∞[→
R, (x, t) 7→ m[x](t), representing the percentage of agents
in state x at time t, which satisfies
∫
R
m[x](t)dx = 1 for
every t. Let us also define the mean opinion at time t as
m(t) :=
∫
R
xm[x](t)dx.
The objective of the agent is to adjust his opinion based
on the average opinion of all agents. This reflects a typical
crowd-seeking behavior in that emulating others brings some
benefits and makes an agent more comfortable and at ease.
Then, for the agents, consider a running cost g1 : R×R×
R→ [0,+∞[, (x,m, u1) 7→ g1(x,m, u1) of the form:
g1(x,m, u1) =
1
2
(
a1
(
m− x
)2
+ c1u
2
1
)
. (2)
Also consider a final cost Ψ1 : R×R→ [0,+∞[, (m,x) 7→
Ψ1(m,x) of the form
Ψ1(m,x) =
1
2
S1
(
m− x
)2
.
We suppose that the stubborn agent wants to attract the
agent’s opinions towards his opinion itself, and that such an
opinion correspond to x = 0. Hence, for the stubborn agent,
we consider a running cost (one per every opinion evolution)
g2 : R× R→ [0,+∞[, (x, u2) 7→ g2(x, u2) of the form:
g2(x, u2) =
1
2
(
a2x
2 + c2u
2
2
)
. (3)
We also consider a final cost Ψ2 : R→ [0,+∞[, of the form
Ψ2(x) =
1
2
S2x
2.
The parameters a1, c1, S1, a2, c2, S2 are positive and fixed.
Problem 1: The problem is the following: given an initial
distribution of opinionsm0 and the corresponding meanm0 :
R → R, for every (x, t) ∈ R × [0, T ], minimize over all
measurable control u1(·) and over all measurable controls
u2(·), the following two cost functionals, respectively
min
u1(.)
E
(∫ T
t
g1(X(s),m(s), u1(s))ds+Ψ1(m(T ), X(T ))
)
,
min
u2(.)
E
(∫ T
t
g2(X(s), u2(s))ds+Ψ2(X(T ))
)
,
where X(·) is the trajectory of the stochastic controlled
equation starting from the single opinion x, and m(·) is the
evolution of the mean distribution of the opinions if every
one of the agents behaves optimally.
The problem has then a differential game feature. We have
a family of differential games, one per every initial opinion
x, where the players are all the (homogeneous) agents with
that initial opinion and the stubborn agent. The dynamics
depends on both controls, and the dynamics of the opinion
also depends on the mean opinion evolution (and so, inside
the family, the differential games are mutually influenced).
Being a differential game, we are interested in possible
Nash equilibria. A pair of controls (u∗1(·), u∗2(·)) is a Nash
equilibrium if, denoting by v1 (resp. v2) the value function
of the first (resp. second) player when the second (resp. first)
one implements u∗2 (resp. u
∗
1), then v1 (resp. v2) is obtained
exactly when the first (resp. second) player implements u∗1
(resp. u∗2).
The problem then results in the following mean field game
system for the unknown scalar functions v1(x, t), v2(x, t),
and m(x, t)

−∂tv1(x, t)− σ
2
2
∂2xxv1(x, t) + {−f(x, u∗1, u∗2)∂xv1(x, t)
−g1(x,m(t), u1)} = 0 in R× [0, T [,
v1(x, T ) = Ψ1(x) in R,
−∂tv2(x, t)− σ
2
2
∂2xxv2(x, t) + {−f(x, u∗1, u∗2)∂xv2(x, t)
−g2(x,m(t), u2(x, t))} = 0 in R× [0, T [,
v2(x, T ) = Ψ2(x) in R,
∂tm(x, t) + ∂x(m(x, t)f(X,u
∗
1, u
∗
2))
−σ22 ∂2xxm(x, t) = 0, in R× [0, T [,
m(x, 0) = m0(x) in R.
Now, it is reasonable, to consider v1 and v2 have a quadratic
form:
v1(x, t) =
q1(t)
2
(x−m(t))2, v2(x, t) = q2(t)
2
x2,
and so, searching the optimal time-varying state-feedback
controls as

u∗1(x, t) = argmaxu1∈R{−f(x, u1, u∗2)∂xv1(x, t)−g1(x,m(t), u1)},
u∗2(x, t) = argmaxu2∈R{−f(x, u∗1, u2)∂xv2(x, t)−g2(x,m(t), u2)},
(4)
we get
u∗1(x, t) = −
q1(t)
c1
(x−m(t)), u∗2(x, t) = −
q1(t)
c2
x.
Here, q1(·) and q2(·) are solutions of the corresponding
Riccati equations.
III. MICROSCOPIC MODEL
Let a finite set of players {1, . . . , n} be given and let Yi(t)
for all i = 1, . . . , n be the corresponding state. Let us collect
all states in a state vector Y (t) = [Y1(t), . . . , Yn(t)]
T . Given
the optimal controls u∗1(x, t) and u
∗
2(x, t) as computed above
the evolution of the state vector is captured by the Stochastic
Differential Equation (SDE)
dY (t) =
[
q1
c1
(m1− Y (t))− q2
c2
Y (t)
]
dt+ σdB(t). (5)
For future purposes it is convenient to rewrite (5) making
use of a stochastic matrix. To do this, let us introduce W =
− q1
c1
L + I , where L is the Laplacian of a fully connected
network. Observe that
W = WT W1 = 1. (6)
Then, we can rewrite (5) as
dY (t) =
[
(W − I)Y (t)− q2
c2
Y (t)
]
dt+ σdB(t) (7)
The above equation is useful as it allows us to analyze the
evolution of the stochastic properties of the mean opinion
m(t). Indeed, observe that m(t) is a stochastic process with
first-order moment satisfying
Edm(t) = −q2
c2
Em(t)dt.
Then, we can infer that the first-order moment converges
exponentially to zero according to
Em(t) = e−
q2
c2
t
Em(t)
and therefore Em(t)→ 0.
Definition 1 (asymptotic ε-stability): We say that a
stochastic process ξ(t), t ≥ 0 is asymptotically ε-stable if
limt→∞ sup ‖ξ‖ ≤ ε.
The next theorem establishes that the mean opinion con-
verges to a neighborhood of zero almost surely.
Theorem 1: There exists ε > 0 such that the mean opinion
is ε-stable w.p.1,
lim
t→∞
‖m(t)‖ ≤ ε, w.p.1.
Furthermore, the smallest ε for which the above holds is
ε =
√
1
2
c2
q2
σ2
n2
. (8)
Proof: This proof is within the framework of Lyapunov
stochastic stability theory (cfg. [14], system (64.51)). We
start by observing that
dm(t) = 1
n
1
T dY (t)
= 1
n
1
T
[
(W − I)Y (t)− q2
c2
Y (t)
]
dt+ 1
n
1
TσdB(t)
= − 1
n
1
T q2
c2
Y (t)dt+ 1
n
1
TσdB(t)
= − q2
c2
m(t)dt+ 1
n
1
TσdB(t).
(9)
The above SDE is linear and the corresponding stochas-
tic process can be studied in the framework of stochastic
stability theory [14]. To do this, consider the infinitesimal
generator
L = 1
2
σ2
d2
dm2
− q2
c2
m(t)
d
dm(t)
. (10)
The above equation is obtained from
1
2
E
(
dm2
d2
dm2
)
+ E
(
dm
d
dm
)
=
1
2
[
E
(
(−q2
c2
)2m(t)2dt2
)
+ E
(
σ2dB(t)2)
+E
(
2(−q2
c2
)m(t)dtσdB(t)
)]
d2
dm(t)2
+
[
E
(
(−q2
c2
)m(t)dt
)
+ E (σdB(t))
]
d
dm(t)
.
Now, recalling that for a Brownian motion it holds EdB(t) =
0 and EdB(t)2 → 0 and ignoring the second-order terms (in
dt2 or dtdB(t)) we obtain (10).
Consider a candidate Lyapunov function V (m) = 12m(t)
2.
The idea is to show that there exists a finite scalar κ and a
neighborhood of zero of size κ, denoted by Nκ = {m ∈
R|V (m) ≤ κ}, such that the stochastic derivative of V (m)
is negative, i.e.
LV (m(t)) := limdt→0 EV (m(t+dt))−V (m(t))dt < 0,
for all m(t) 6∈ Nκ. (11)
Given the above set, we also need to show that once m(t) ∈
Nκ thenm(t)+dm(t) ∈ Nκ. Actually, the theory establishes
that if the former condition holds true, which is LV (m(t)) <
0, then V (m(t)) is a supermartingale whenever m(t) is not
in Nκ and therefore by the martingale convergence theorem
∃ t such that V (m(t)) ≤ κ. Combining this with the property
m(t) + dm(t) ∈ Nκ for every m(t) ∈ Nκ we obtain
limt→∞ V (m(t)) ≤ κ w.p.1 (almost surely), which in turn
implies limt→∞ ‖m(t)‖ ≤ ε =
√
2κ w.p.1.
To see that LV (m(t)) < 0 is true, observe that from (9)
we have
LV (m) = −q2
c2
m2 +
1
2
σ2
n2
.
Now, consider the level setsNκ = {m(t) ∈ R|V (m(t)) ≤
κ} and observe that there always exists a κˆ big enough and
finite such that for every m(t) 6∈ Nκˆ, i.e., 12m(t)2 > κˆ, we
have q2
c2
m2 > 12
σ2
n2
. The latter implies LV (m(t)) < 0 for
all m(t) 6∈ Nκˆ, which proves that every level set Nκ where
κ ≥ κˆ is contractive.
In other words, for every m(t) ∈ ∂Nκˆ, m(t+ dt) ∈ Nκˆ.
The same reasoning proves that every level set Nκ where
κ ≥ κˆ is contractive. Thus, we can conclude that for every
κ ≥ κˆ there exists an ε = √2κ for which the level set
{m ∈ R| ‖m‖ ≤ ε} is contractive. A value for kˆ is{
kˆ := min k
{m|V (m) ≤ k} ⊃
{
m| q2
c2
m2 > 12
σ2
n2
}
.
(12)
which returns
kˆ =
1
4
c2
q2
σ2
n2
.
It is apparent that Nκˆ is also control invariant, which
means that for every m ∈ Nκˆ, m+ dm ∈ Nκˆ.
To prove (8), let us substitute kˆ = 14
c2
q2
σ2
n2
into ε =
√
2κ
and then we obtain ε =
√
1
2
c2
q2
σ2
n2
.
A direct consequence of the above result is that the
bounding set Nκˆ shrinks for increasing number of players
and collapses asymptotically to the origin for n tending to
infinity.
Corollary 1: For n → ∞ the mean opinion converges
asymptotically to zero,
lim
t→∞
m(t) = 0.
Now, our aim is to analyze convergence of the agents to
their average. To this purpose, define the averaging matrix
M = 1
n
1 ⊗ 1. Then for a given vector Y (t) we have
MY (t) = ( 1
n
1 ⊗ 1)Y (t) = 1
n
11
TY (t) = m(t)1. In other
wordsMY (t) is the vector all of whose components are the
average of the entries of Y (t). The averaging matrix is useful
to introduce the error vector e(t) describing the deviations
of the components of Y (t) from their average. For the error
vector we can write the expression below, which relates e(t)
to Y (t):
e(t) = Y (t)− 1
n
1⊗ 1TY (t)
= Y (t)−m(t)1
= (I −M)Y (t).
The next result establishes that the error vector converges
to zero which implies that all opinions converge to the mean
opinion.
Theorem 2: For each pi > 0 there exists an ε(pi) > 0 such
that
P(‖e(t)‖∞ ≤ ε(pi)) > 1− pi. (13)
Proof: The time evolution of the error vector is repre-
sented by the SDE
de(t) = (I −M)
[
(W − I)Y (t)− q2
c2
Y (t)
]
dt
+(I −M)σdB(t)
= (W −M)(I −M)Y (t)dt− e(t)dt
−(I −M)q2
c2
Y (t)dt+ (I −M)σdB(t)
=
(
W −M− I − q2
c2
I
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
e(t)dt+ (I −M)σdB(t).
The above SDE is linear and the corresponding stochas-
tic process can be studied in the framework of stochastic
stability theory [14]. To do this, consider the infinitesimal
generator
L = 1
2
σ2(I −M)T (I −M) d
2
de(t)2
+Ae(t)
d
de(t)
. (14)
Now, recalling that for a Brownian motion it holds EdB(t) =
0 and EdB(t)2 → 0 and ignoring the second-order terms (in
dt2 or dtdB(t)) we obtain (14).
Observe that from (6) we have that ‖W −M‖ < 1 which
in turn implies that A is negative definite, i.e., ξTAξ < 0
for all ξ ∈ Rn. We use this fact to study the infinitesimal
generator of the Lyapunov function V (e) = 12e
T e.
We aim to prove that there exists a finite scalar κ and
a neighborhood of zero of size κ, denoted by Nκ = {e ∈
R
n|V (e) ≤ κ}, such that LV (e(t)) < 0 for all e(t) 6∈ Nκ,
where L is the infinitesimal generator of the process e(t).
Again we recall that if the former condition holds true,
which is LV (e(t)) < 0, then V (e(t)) is a supermartingale
whenever e(t) is not in Nκ and therefore by the martingale
convergence theorem ∃ t such that V (e(t)) ≤ κ.
Let us first consider the SDE for the error vector de(t) =
Ae(t)dt + (I −M)σdB(t) and rewrite (I −M)σdB(t) =∑
bidBi(t) where
bi = σ


− 1
n
...
1− 1
n
...
− 1
n

 ith row. (15)
Then, for the infinitesimal generator of the Lyapunov func-
tion it holds
LV (e) = e(t)TAe(t) + 1
2
n∑
i=1
Σii
= e(t)TAe(t) +
1
2
nσ2[(n− 1) 1
n2
+ (1− 1
n
)2],
where Σ =
∑n
k=1 bkb
T
k ∈ Rn×n whose elements in the
principal diagonal are Σii = σ
2[(n− 1) 1
n2
+ (1− 1
n
)2].
Now, consider the level sets Nκ = {e(t) ∈ Rn|V (e(t)) ≤
κ} and observe that there always exists a κˆ big enough and
finite such that for every e(t) 6∈ Nκˆ, i.e., 12e(t)T e(t) > κˆ,
we have e(t)TAe(t)+ 12nσ
2[(n−1) 1
n2
+(1− 1
n
)2] < 0. The
latter means LV (e(t)) < 0 for all e(t) 6∈ Nκˆ, which proves
that every level set Nκ where κ ≥ κˆ is contractive.
In other words, for every e(t) ∈ ∂Nκˆ, e(t + dt) ∈ Nκˆ.
The same reasoning proves that every level set Nκ where
κ ≥ κˆ is contractive. Thus, we can conclude that for every
κ ≥ κˆ there exists an ε = √2κ for which the level set
{m ∈ R| ‖m‖ ≤ ε} is contractive. A value for kˆ can be
obtained solving the optimization problem

kˆ := min k
{e|V (e) ≤ k} ⊃ {e| e(t)TAe(t)
+ 12nσ
2[(n− 1) 1
n2
+ (1− 1
n
)2] < 0
}
.
(16)
IV. NUMERICAL STUDIES
Numerical studies include three main sets of simulations
as summarized in Figg. 1-3. The first set highlights the
relation between the system response and the coefficient
of attraction q1 among the opinions: the mean distribution
n xmin xmax c1 c2 T m0 std(m0)
103 0 1 1 1 10 0.8 0.05
TABLE I
CONSTANT SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
q1 q2 σ
I {1, 2, 3} 1.5 0.001
II 1 {1.5, 2.5, 3} 0.001
III 1 1.5 {0.001, 0.01, 0.05}
TABLE II
VARYING SIMULATION PARAMETERS WITH DIFFERENT SIMULATION
SETS.
m(t) fluctuates while decreasing and the standard deviation
std(m(t)) decays gradually to zero. The second set
emphasizes how the system evolves in response to a higher
coefficient of attraction q2 to zero, which corresponds to
increasing the stubborn agent’s attraction force: both the
mean distribution m(t) and the standard deviation std(m(t))
decrease monotonically, similarly to the evolutions shown
in the first set of simulations. The third set simulates the
system under various effects of the Brownian motion: the
mean distribution m(t) first increases, and then decreases
linearly and the standard deviation std(m(t)) first increases
until it hits a peak, and then fluctuates.
Simulations of numerical examples have been done using
the algorithm below and the following parameters, also
shown in Tables I-II. The number of agents is set to n =
103. The set of states is a discretization of the interval
[0, 1[ with step size dx = 10−4, i.e. X = {xmin, xmin +
0.001, . . . , xmax}. The horizon length is T = 10, large
enough to show convergence of the population plots. As
regards the initial distribution, we assume m0 to be gaussian
with mean m¯0 = 0.8 and standard deviation std(m0) =
0.05. Parameter σ is set to a value between 0.001 and 0.05.
First set of simulations. The first set of simulations
highlights how the coefficient that regulates the aggregation
forces among the opinions, q1, is a factor in reducing the
sparsity of the opinions, which is measured by the standard
deviation std(m(t)). From top-left to bottom-left, Figure
1 shows the distribution evolution m(t) vs. the state x(t)
at different times. The initial distribution is modeled as
a gaussian with mean m0 = 0.8 and standard deviation
std(m0) = 0.05. Parameter q1 varies from q1 = 1 (top),
q1 = 2 (middle) and q1 = 3 (bottom). The graphics on the
right display the time plot m(t) (solid line and y-axis labels
on the left) and the evolution of the standard deviation
std(m(t)) (dashed line and y-axis labels on the right). It is
worth noting that the standard deviation tends to zero faster
and faster as long as the attraction among the opinions
grows: as it can be seen from the graphics, the distributions
at a same time instant get sharper with higher values of q1.
Algorithm
Input: Set of parameters as in Tables I-II
Output: Distribution function m(t), mean m(t) and
standard deviation std(m(t)).
1 : Initialize. Generate x0 from Gaussian distribution
with mean m¯0 and standard deviation std(m0),
2 : for time t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do
3 : if t > 0, then compute m(t), m(t),
and std(mt),
4 : end if
5 : for player i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
6 : compute X(t+ 1) by executing (1),
7 : end for
8 : end for
9 : STOP
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Fig. 1. First set of simulations: the sparsity of the distribution evolution
becomes smaller as the coefficient q1 grows. The standard deviation
std(m(t)) goes to zero faster, from top to bottom.
Second set of simulations. The second set of simulation
shows the connection between the coefficient q2, which
describes the attracting force exhibited by the stubborn agent,
and the convergence speed of the distribution toward zero.
The graphics on the left show this effect. In particular, the
graphics plot the distribution evolution m(t) with respect to
the state x(t) at different times. The initial distribution is
the same as in the first set of simulations, with identical
mean and standard deviation, while q2 varies from q2 = 1.5
(top), q2 = 2.5 (middle) and q2 = 3 (bottom). The opinions
approach zero with a speed that increases with q3. The
graphics on the right display the time plot m¯(t) (solid line
and y-axis labels on the left) and the evolution of the standard
deviation std(mt) (dashed line and y-axis labels on the
right), pointing out that the mean tends to zero faster with
higher values of the coefficient.
Third set of simulations. The last set of simulations shows
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Fig. 2. Second set of simulations: the distribution evolution goes faster
toward zero as q2 grows. The mean m¯(t) goes to zero faster, from top to
bottom.
the effects of the Brownian motion. The initial conditions
are identical to the ones of the previous simulations, and
the only varying parameter is σ from σ = 0.001 (top),
σ = 0.01 (middle) and σ = 0.05 (bottom). The graphics on
the left show this effect, by plotting the distribution evolution
m(t) as function of the state x(t) at different times. With
higher values of σ the evolution reacts in two ways: for σ
moderately small (second graphics from top to bottom on the
left column), opinions manage to gather around a mean, thus
letting the standard deviation slowly decrease to zero; when
σ becomes bigger, the attraction among the opinions and the
force in zero are too weak to let them gather (for q1 = 1 and
q2 = 1.5). The only way to compensate this is to increase
those two coefficients. The graphics on the right display the
time plot m(t) (solid line and y-axis labeling on the left) and
the evolution of the standard deviation std(m(t)) (dashed
line and y-axis labeling on the right). In the last graph,
the only way to incentivize the convergence of the standard
deviation std(m(t)) to zero is by increasing the coefficients
q1 and q2.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied a scenario where all agents reach ε-
consensus almost surely in a neighborhood of the stubborn
agent’s opinion. We have shown that such a scenario is mean
field equilibrium for the game of interest. Future research
will address local interactions among the players and provide
a game theoretic understanding for the formation of clusters.
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